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POINT I. 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES SHOULD BE ALLOWED 
FOR A RECKLESS DISREGARD OF PUBLIC 
SAFETY. 
Rio Grande argues that punitive damages should not 
be allowed for a conscious disregard of public safety. 
(Reply Brief of Rio Grande, at P. 23.) 
Older cases required malice-in-fact in order to 
support a claim for punitive damages. The more modern view 
is that malice-in-law will support a claim for punitive 
damages. See e.g., Branch v. Western Petroleum, Inc., 657 
P.2d 267 (Utah 1983). 
It is often held that recklessness is a component 
of malice-in-law: 
Utah . . . A defendant's conduct must be 
malicious or in reckless disregard for 
the rights of others, although actual 
intent to cause injury is not necessary. 
Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hosp. Inc., 675 
P.2d 1179, 1186 (Utah 1983). 
Colorado . . . the injury complained of is 
attended by circumstances of fraud, 
malice or insult, or a wanton and 
reckless disregard of the injured 
party's rights and feelings. Colo. 
Rev. Stat., § 13-21-102 (1973). 
1 
Connecticut . . • when the evidence shows a 
reckless indifference to the rights of 
others or is an intentional and wanton 
violation of those rights. Collens v. 
New Cannan Water Co., 155 Conn. 477, 
234 A.2d 825, 832 (1967). 
District of Columbia . . . for outrageous 
conduct such as maliciousness, 
wantonness, gross fraud, recklessness, 
and willful disregard of another's 
rights. Riggs Nat. Bank v. Price, 359 
A.2d 25, 28 (D.C. App. 1976). 
Hawaii . . . for willful, maliciousness, 
wanton or aggravated wrongs where a 
defendant has acted with a reckless 
indifference to the rights of another. 
Goo v. Continental Cas. Co., 52 Haw. 
235, 473 P.2d 563, 566 (1970). 
Iowa . . . in a reckless, wanton and grossly 
negligent manner in total disregard for 
the safety of workmen. Croxen v. U.S. 
Chemical Corp. of Wise, 558 F.Supp. 6 
(N.D. Iowa 1982) 
Missouri . . . There must be, in order to 
justify punitive damages, some element 
of wantonness or bad motive, but if one 
intentionally does a wrongful act and 
knows at the time that it is wrongful, 
he does it wantonly and with a bad 
motive . . . . Furthermore, an evil 
intent may be implied from reckless 
disregard of another's rights and 
interests. Amish v. Walnut Creek 
Development, Inc., 631 S.W.2d 866 (Mo. 
App. 1982). 
2 
New Mexico • . . when the conduct of the 
wrongdoer may be said to be maliciously 
intentional, fraudulent, oppressive, or 
committed recklessly or with a wanton 
disregard of the plaintiff's rights. 
Loucks v. Albuquerque Nat. Bank, 76 N.M. 
735, 418 P.2d 191 (1966) . 
New York . . . based upon tortious acts which 
involve ingredients of malice, fraud, 
oppression, insult, wanton or reckless 
disregard of the plaintiff's rights, or 
other circumstances of aggravation. Le 
Mistral, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting 
System, 61 App. Div.2d 491, 402 N.Y.S.2d 
815, 817 (1978) . 
Ohio . . . caused by intentional, reckless, 
wanton, wilful[sic] and gross acts or by 
malice inferred conduct and surrounding 
circumstances. Rubeck v. Huffman, 54 
Ohio St.2d 20, 374 N.E.2d 411, 413 
(1978) . 
Rhode Island . . . upon evidence of such 
willfulness, recklessness or wickedness, 
on the part of the party at fault, as 
amounted to criminality. Sherman v. 
McDermott, 114 R.I. 1107, 329 A.2d 195, 
196 (1974). 
South Carolina . . . must be malice, ill 
will, a conscious indifference to the 
rights of others, or a reckless 
disregard thereof. King v. Allstate 
Ins. Co., 272 S.C. 259, 251 S.E.2d 194, 
196 (1979). 
Virginia . . . only where there is misconduct 
or actual malice, or such recklessness 
or negligence as to evince, a conscious 
disregard of the rights of others. 
Jordan v. Sauve, 219 Va. 448, 247 S.E.2d 
739, 741 (1978) . 
3 
Wyoming . . . legal malice has been defined 
as 'wrongful or illegal conduct 
committed or continued with a willful or 
reckless disregard of another1s rights,1 
Sears v. Summit, Inc., 616 P.2d at 765, 
770 (Wyo. 1980) . 
POINT II. 
THERE IS EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD 
FROM WHICH A JURY COULD CONCLUDE 
THAT RIO GRANDE ACTED IN RECK-
LESS DISREGARD OF PUBLIC SAFETY. 
Rio Grande argues that there was nothing reckless 
about installing a stop sign. 
However, Rio Grande misunderstands the argument. 
Gleave does not seek punitive damages simply because Rio 
Grande installed a stop sign. Rather, Gleave seeks punitive 
damages because Rio Grande left that temporary stop sign in 
place for over ten years. During that entire decade Rio 
Grande knew that the stop sign was only intended for 
temporary use. Indeed, Rio Grande had full knowledge that 
long-term use of such stop signs would cause increased 
danger. (See Point VII A, Gleavefs opening brief.) 
Furthermore, Rio Grande took no safety precautions 
other than placing the stop sign. Specifically, Rio Grande 
did not burn off the weeds that obstructed vision. Nor did 
Rio Grande slow the speed of its trains. Indeed, Rio Grande 
had no rules or regulations at all to protect motorists at 
4 
railroad crossings. Finally, Rio Grande has never installed 
the red flashing lights that were recommended in 1974. 
(See Point VII B, Gleave's opening brief.) 
We have noted, above, that Rio Grande took no 
steps to improve safety at the crossing in over a decade. 
The failure to act was not based on any misunderstanding. 
The failure to act was based upon pure financial self 
interest. Rio Grande's reply brief contains an interesting 
comment: 
. . . Rio Grande's desire to have a 
stop sign at the subject crossing made 
sense as a temporary measure (i.e. until 
UDOT obtained federal funds to install 
active signals). 
Reply Brief of Rio Grande, 
at p.22. 
Thus, Rio Grande simply didn't want to incur the 
expense of installing the red flashing light. Rather, Rio 
Grande wanted to wait for the State of Utah to install the 
light. In turn, the State of Utah didn't want to incur the 
expense of a red flashing light. The State of Utah waited 
for the federal government to pay for the red flashing 
— Rio Grande argues that it had no power to install such 
flashing lights without approval of the State of Utah. 
However, that argument still doesn't get Rio Grande off the 
hook. Here, there is no evidence that Rio Grande requested 
any approval from the State of Utah to permit Rio Grande to 
install a red flashing light at Rio Grande's expense. Nor 
is there any evidence that Rio Grande requested the State of 
Utah to install a red flashing light at the State of Utah's 
expense. 
5 
light. Thus, everyone knew of the danger. However, 
everyone waited—hoping that someone else would pay. In the 
meantime, Gleave was squashed like a bug. 
In summary, Rio Grande knew of the grave danger. 
However, Rio Grande did almost nothing at all. The only 
thing Rio Grande did was to install a stop sign which simply 
made matters worse. A jury could conclude, on these facts, 
that Rio Grande acted in reckless disregard for the public 
safety. 
POINT III. 
THE PREJUDGMENT INTEREST 
STATUTES SHOULD BE BROADLY 
CONSTRUED TO LESSEN COURT 
DELAYS. 
Rio Grande's brief argues legislative intent. 
(See p. 20 of grey cover brief.) However, Rio Grande has 
failed to recognize the true legislative intent. 
In a perfect world, an injured party would have 
his day in court immediately after an accident. However, 
our world is flawed. An injured person must wait a year—or 
two—or three to get that date in court—then he must wait 
another year or two for an appeal. 
The only issue is who gets the benefit of that 
court delay. It is not uncommon for the ultimate resolution 
of a case (including appeal) to take up to six years. 
6 
During that six years, a wrongdoer could save enough on 
interest to pay the entire judgment. Thus, wrongdoers (and 
defense law firms) have a powerful motive to delay and clog 
the courts• 
The legislature has given the courts a tool to 
attack that evil. The tool is § 78-27-44, Utah Code Ann. . 
This Court should construe the statute broadly to make full 
use of that tool. 
POINT IV. 
THE COURT SHOULD NOT LUMP 
ALL ISSUES TOGETHER FOR 
REMAND. 
.It is likely that the case must be remanded on 
some issues. There might be an issue of contribution 
between Rio Grande and the State of Utah. Also, the Court 
might reinstate the issue of punitive damages. 
Thus, the question will arise whether to affirm in 
part and remand some issues; or whether to lump everything 
together and remand on all issues. 
In that regard, Gleave urges the Court to remember 
the ancient Latin maxim, "justice delayed is justice 
denied." Gleave was injured over three years ago. Since 
then, he has not been able to work. He has paid thousands 
and thousands of dollars for experts and other costs at the 
first trial. 
7 
If it is necessary to re-try all issues 
together—so be it. However, that pathway is a great 
hardship to Cleave. Thus, we urge the Court, if at all 
possible, not to lump all issues together. Rather, we urge 
the Court to sever and affirm the issue of liability and 
compensatory damages. The remaining issues can be remanded 
for further proceedings. 
Respectfully submitted this Q* day of 
_ , 1985. 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Respondent 
and Cross-Appellant 
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By: 
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